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Abstract
Digital video has become increasingly susceptible to
spatio-temporal manipulations as a result of recent ad-
vances in video editing tools. Therefore it is difficult to get
video records to stand up as 100% secure evidence in court,
for example for a criminal evidence.
In this paper, we propose a novel digital video authen-
tication approach based on a secure self-embedding tech-
nique. Our approach allows authentication of the origin of
the video data from the embedded information after reason-
able spatial manipulations. In addition, temporal manipu-
lations can also be detected using our approach.
1. Introduction
Video forgery is a technique for generating fake video
by altering, combining, or creating new video content. Us-
ing commonly available hardware and software, it is now
feasible to perform digital video editing not only to insert,
delete or replace groups of frames, but also to insert or
delete objects from those frames without introducing vis-
ible artifacts.
The ease of editing visual data in the digital domain has
facilitated unauthorized tampering without leaving any per-
ceptible traces. Therefore recorded CCTV (Closed-Circuit
TeleVision) does not stand up in court as a 100% reliable
evidence. Most of the research work carried out in the
area of CCTV surveillance has dealt with object detection,
object recognition, tracking, behaviour analysis and image
retrieval. Not much work has been done in CCTV video
forgery detection.
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Figure 1. Our proposed method.
The main goal of our work is to prevent the possibil-
ity of creating a forgery that goes undetected. For exam-
ple, a secure CCTV camera equipped with a watermark-
ing/steganography chip may authenticate every image it
takes before storing it on devices, see Figure 1. Such smart
images may play an important role in detecting digital forg-
eries or establishing the origin of digital video content. The
case and extent of such manipulations highlights the need
for authentication and integrity verification mechanisms in
applications such as video for court evidence.
Manipulations on video signals fall into two categories,
[6, 14]. The first type covers attacks that tamper with the
intensity patterns of the video, e.g. compression, noise,
etc. The second type covers time-based tampering (such
as frame inserting and dropping), disrupting the frame se-
quencing, e.g. frame cuts, swapping, deletion or foreign
frame insertion and spatial-based attacks (such as removing
and replacing content in a frame).
This paper is mainly focused on the second type of at-
tacks. To detect the unauthorised manipulation of such
video footages, a video authentication system should ver-
ify that the video taken has not been tampered with in the
temporal or in the spatial domains. Authentication has al-
ways been an important issue [11]. Content authentication
is a process by which a user is guaranteed that video con-
tent is original and has not been maliciously modified. One
example is surveillance and site monitoring footage where
incentives exist to remove incriminating material.
Based on the embedding of specific digital signatures
(i.e. a set of authentication bits that summarise the image
content), video may be viewed by authorized personnel but
made unavailable to others. Self-embedding refers to the
process where a compressed copy of the image/video is em-
bedded into itself during watermarking. Most of the algo-
rithms deal with image authentication, for example the work
in [4, 9]. After self-embedding, it is possible to recover por-
tions of the image that have been cropped, replaced, dam-
aged etc. without accessing the original image.
Authentication of video is very similar to that of still im-
ages. In particular, we can evaluate a video as a sequence
of still images where each image (or frame) is authenticated
individually. Therefore we have developed a new video au-
thentication method based on a secure and improved self-
embedding algorithm proposed in [2]. Our method is dis-
cussed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the self-embedding
approach. The secure image encryption algorithm is ex-
plained in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 explain result and
provide discussion and conclusions respectively.
2. Video Authentication Method
Authentication of video is very similar to that of still im-
ages. In particular, we can evaluate a video as a sequence
of still images where each image (or frame) is authenticated
individually. Cheddad et al. [2] proposed a method to de-
tect tampering within frames (i.e. spatial manipulations)
using the image verification scheme. In addition to spatial
manipulations, a common class of attacks on digital video
is re-indexing, where the sequence of events is tampered.
Since random ordering of authentic frames is not an authen-
tic video sequence, the temporal location of frames should
also be verified. Therefore we further developed Cheddad et
al.’s [2] work to handle temporal attacks. As our main goal
is to prevent the possibility of creating a forgery that goes
undetected and establishing the origin of the digital video
content, we embed the spatial and temporal information in
the video sequence.
Video embedding is not the same as an image embedding
as video contains the temporal information. We can con-
sider a video file as an ordered collection of images. Em-
bedding the spatial and temporal content in each image of
a video file will be a time consuming task and also may be
an unessential task in that most neighbouring image frames
represent similar spatial content. Therefore instead of hid-
ing spatial content in each image sequence, the spatial con-
tents are only hidden in the detected key frames of image
sequences. At the same time temporal contents are hidden
in every image in the video file. Therefore each image is
checked for key frames and if the key frame is detected then
the temporal and spatial contents are embedded. Otherwise
only the temporal content is embedded.
It is true that important events of the video file can be
represented by a set of key frames. The key frames can be
detected using shot change detection techniques. Therefore
first the video is converted to an ordered collection of im-
ages and then the key frames are detected. Our key frame
detection method is explained in Section 2.1.
2.1. Key frame detection
There are many algorithms available to detect shot
boundaries within video sequences [10, 12, 13, 18]. These
algorithms calculate different features of the video data, and
can be used as stand-alone shot boundary detection systems.
The algorithm [10] computes the average of the intensity
values for each component (YUV, RGB, etc.) in the current
frame and compares it with that for the following frame.
In the algorithm [12], each region of the image is repre-
sented by second order statistics under the assumption that
this property remains constant over the region.
The shot change boundary position detection based on
histogram comparison methods [13, 18] are quite popular
because they are fast and motion insensitive. Therefore we
used a histogram based technique for the key frame detec-
tion process. The key frames are detected based on the
shot change boundary positions in video sequences. In the
method, a time series of discontinuity feature values f(n)
are calculated for each frame. The dissimilarity feature
value for frame n is f(n) = d(n − 1, n). Here we use a
function d(n − 1, n) to measure the dissimilarity between
frame n− 1 and n and it is measured by:
d(Hn−1,Hn) =
√√√√ G∑
i=1
(Hn−1(i)−Hn(i))2 (1)
Here Hn denotes the intensity histogram of the nth
frame and i is one of the G possible intensity (grayscale)
values. The shot boundary detection decision can be made
based on a threshold of dissimilarity measure. We pick key
frame positions from f(n) based on the adaptive threshold-
ing technique which will be explained in 2.2.
2.2. The adaptive thresholding technique
We have developed an adaptive thresholding technique
for the adaptation process based on [7]. In [17], the authors
apply a local thresholding method whereby the frame dif-
ferences of successive m frames is examined. They then
declare a shot change when two conditions are simultane-
ously satisfied: (1) the difference is the maximum within a
symmetric sliding windows of size 2m − 1. (2) the differ-
ence is n times the second largest maximum in the sliding
window. Expanding this work, a method was proposed in
which the means and standard deviations from either side
of the middle sample in the window are calculated [7]. The
middle sample represents a shot change if the conditions
below are simultaneously satisfied: (1) the middle sample
is the maximum in the window. (2) the middle sample is
greater than max(µleft + Td
√
σleft, µright + Td
√
σright),
where Td is given a value of 5. The method is as follows.
mT = µN + Td
√
σN (2)
We estimate the mean µN and variance σN of N dynam-
ically, from the similarity measures m of M neighbouring
frames. The decision threshold mT is recalculated for each
new frame using the above method and a decision is made.
The key frames are detected based on the above histogram
similarity and adaptive thresholding techniques. The origin
of spatial content is embedded in the detected key frames.
Our self-embedding approach is explained in Section 3.
3. Self-Embedding
Our self-embedding method consists of two parts, self-
embedding and authentication. In the self-embedding
phase, a binary version of the original content (also called
payload) is embedded into the original image (also called
the cover image). The payload includes spatial and tempo-
ral contents.
Since we need means of protecting the video files against
forgery, it is essential that the payload will carry as much
information from the cover image as possible. An approx-
imation of the cover video image file can be achieved by
applying the binarization techniques which results in a bi-
nary image demanding only 1 bit per pixel for storage. In
our method, three different binary versions of the original
image are considered as spatial payload, see Figure 2. Fig-
ure 2, (b), (c) and (d) represent payload of the cover image.
Figure 2. (a) original image. (b) created
by dithering using the method described
by Floyd and Steinberg [8], (c) created by
thresholding the original image and (d) cre-
ated by Canny edge operator respectively.
Dittman et al. [5] address the problem of embedding
the temporal content by embedding the SMPTE (Society of
Motion Picture and Television Engineers [15]) time code
in each frame. Any alteration in the sequence of events is
detected by checking the timing information. SMPTE offers
a timing signal for a whole day (hh:mm:ss:ff, where f stands
for frame) with a resolution down to single video frames.
If a time code like SMPTE could be embbeded in a video
stream as a watermark, every position frame in the stream
would include a complete timing information, see Figure 3.
Figure 3. SMPTE representation [5].
Instead of timing content embedding [5], we considered
frame number (i.e. frame ID) with some additional infor-
mation for embedding. In total 32 characters are allocated
to represent temporal content for each frames. The fields,
owner name (i.e. authorised body of the video) (ON), name
of the video (NV), frame number (FID), total number of
frames (TNoF) and key frame (KF), are allocated 6, 15, 3,
3 and 1 characters respectively. In addition 1 char is used to
represent the symbols :,−, /,+, see Figure 4(a).
Here the symbols :,−, /,+ are used to separate each
field. Each character is represented as an 8 bits bi-
nary representation, i.e. say, a temporal content, “UU
SDW:American Beauty-045/789+0”, is converted to an 8
bits binary representation, see Figure 4(b). Here KF = 0
means that this frame is not a key frame and 1 means it is.
Then the calculated (32 x 8) binary matrix is directly con-
verted to a binary image, see Figure 4(c).
Figure 4. (a) 32 bits allocation table. The bi-
nary representation of the 32 characters are
shown in (b). (c) corresponding binary im-
age.
Then the binary images calculated from the spatial and
temporal contents (payloads) are embedded in the origi-
nal image (cover image) based on the highly secure self-
embedding algorithm proposed in [2].
4. Image Encryption Algorithm
This algorithm is explained based on [2] and the encryp-
tion algorithm is fully described in [3]. A hash function is
more formally defined as the mapping of bit strings of an
arbitrary finite length to strings of fixed length [16]. Here
we attempt to extend SHA-1 (the terminology and functions
used as building blocks to form SHA-1 are described in
the US Secure Hash Algorithm 1, [1]) to encrypting digital
2D data. The introduction of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
forms together with the output of SHA-1 a strong image en-
cryption setting. Let the key bit stream be λk,l where the
subscripts k and l denote the width and height after resizing
the keys bit stream respectively, i.e., 8, M ∗N , where M,N
are the plain image’s dimension.
The FFT will operate on the Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) of λk,l subject to Eq. 4.
f(u, v) =
1
N
N−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
y=0
F (x, y)e−2pii(xu+yv)/N (3)
where F (x, y) = DCT (λk,l) satisfying Eq. (4). Note that
for the transformation at the FFT and DCT levels we do
not utilise all of the coefficients. Rather, we impose the
following rule, which generates at the end a binary random-
like map. Given the output of Eq. 3 we can derive the binary
map straightforwardly as:
Map(x, y) =
{
1 iff f(u, v) > 0
0 otherwise (4)
This map takes the positive coefficients of the imaginary
part to form the ON pixels in the map. Since the coefficients
are omitted the reconstruction of the password phrase is im-
possible, hence the name Irreversible Fast Fourier Trans-
form (IrFFT). In other words, it is a one way function
which accepts initially a user password. This map finally
is XORed with the binary version of each colour compo-
nent separately. Another phenomenon that we noticed and
we would like to exploit is the sensitivity of the spread of
the FFT coefficients to changes in the spatial domain.
Therefore if we couple this with the sensitivity of the
SHA-1 algorithm to changes of the initial condition, i.e.,
password phrase, we can easily meet the Shannon law re-
quirements, i.e., confusion and diffusion. For instance a
small change in the password string will, with overwhelm-
ing probability, result in a completely different hash and
thus a different image by extension. So, the core idea here
is to transform these changes into the spatial domain where
we can apply 2D-DCT and 2D-FFT that introduce the afore-
mentioned sensitivity to the two dimensional space. As
such, images can be easily encoded securely with password
protection.
The payloads are securely embedded using the the en-
cryption algorithm explained above. Here the embedded
image is called the Stego image. Each Stego image con-
tains two parts: the Header and the Body, see Figure 5.
The temporal content is embedded in the Header part of
every image in the video file. Here the temporal content
size is fixed, (32 x 8) bits. So the size of the header part is
allocated as (4 x column size). Therefore the size of body
part is allocated as ((rows-4) x column size). The spatial
content, the binary version of the particular image, is only
embedded in the body part of that image if that image is
identified as a key frame.
Figure 5. Header and body representation of
the Stego images.
5. Results and Discussion
In this paper, we have developed key frame detection
and video authentication methods. We have downloaded
“American Beauty - 01500.avi” video clip1 for our exper-
iments. This video is 24.64 seconds long, frame rate is 25
frames/second and width and height sizes are 528x224 pix-
els.
5.1. Key Frame Detection
In this experiment, Td and the window size are set to 5
and 20 respectively. The key frames positions in the above
mentioned video sequence are shown in Figure 6 and the
detected key frame images are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6. Key frame detection graph.
1http://lear.inrialpes.fr/people/marszalek/data/hoha/hollywood.tar.gz,
last visit: 19th Aug 2010.
Figure 7. The detected key frames from
“American Beauty - 01500.avi”.
5.2. Video Authentication
Temporal content can be extracted from the stego image.
Any removal of a frame or position changes can be detected
because the flow of the frame number (FID) is distorted.
Moreover TNoF denotes the total number of frames in the
sequences. Based on this, we can identify how many frames
are included as extra or deleted from the video sequence.
KF field denotes whether the image is key frame or not. In
addition ON and NV give more details about the video file.
Spatial content can be extracted only from the key frame.
We analyse the spatial attack using an object insertion
within the stego image. The attacked stego image is rep-
resented by Figure 8(b). Here a new object (i.e. the girl) is
inserted into the stego image. Figures 8(c), (e) and (g) rep-
resent correspondence payload images and Figures 8 (d),
(f) and (h) represent the correspondence extracted payloads
from the attacked stego image.
As an objective measure, the Mean Squared Error (SME)
between the payload and extracted payload images is calcu-
lated. The parameters are given by:
MSE =
1
HW
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
(P (i, j)− EP (i, j))2 (5)
where P (i, j) and EP (i, j) are the pixel values at row i and
column j of the payload and extracted payload images re-
spectively. The measured values are shown in Table 1. Even
though there is not much difference in measured values be-
tween dither, edge and thresholded binary images, thresh-
olded representation of payload embedding provided good
Figure 8. (a) Cover image. (b) attacked stego
image. (c), (e) and (g) represent payloads and
(d), (f) and (h) represent extracted payload af-
ter the spatial attack. These payloads are ex-
tracted only from attacked stego image with-
out accessing the original image.
visible effect of the original spatial content. This experi-
ment shows that the representation of payload (i.e. binary
version of the original content) was more important in our
approach.
Table 1. Mean Square Error
Binary Image MSE
Dither 0.1420
Edge 0.1413
Thresholded 0.1398
6. Conclusions
We have proposed a novel approach to prove the original
content from the forged video which uses an information
hiding technique, [2], that is highly secure. Our method can
handle both spatial and temporal attacks. Binary represen-
tation of the original spatial content is embedded only into
the key frames. Experimental results showed that extracted
thresholded payload from attacked stego image shows much
more visible original content than edge and dither payloads.
The main drawback of our method is that if any key
frame is lost due to the temporal attack then we could not re-
cover the original content. This is the focus of future work.
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